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Recent Developments
Prohibition of Counsel at Selective Service Proceedings:
The Impact of the Weller Case
Selective Service Regulation 1624.1(b) 1 states that "no registrant may be
represented before the local board by anyone acting as attorney or legal
counsel."' 2 In United States v. Weller3 a federal district court in California
rejected 25 years of precedent 4 and held this longstanding regulation in-
valid. 5 The court suggested a two-fold basis for the regulation's invalidity:
1. 32 C.F.R. § 1624.1(b) (1970).
2. This ban applies to the registrant's personal appearance before his local board
when requesting reconsideration of his classification. See id. § 1624.1(a) (1970).
3. 309 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Cal. 1969). The decision is an order granting the de-
fendant's motion to dismiss an indictment for failure to submit to induction. The dis-
trict court distinguished its parent court of appeals' decision in United States v. Tantash,
409 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1969) noting that the apparent approval of the prohibition of
counsel in that case was dictum and that the defendant there had not requested counsel
before his local board. However, since the Weller case, the Ninth Circuit has con-
firmed its Tantash dictum in United States v. Evans, 425 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1970).
The government appealed Weller directly to the Supreme Court under color of the
Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (Supp. V, 1970). After filing the appeal, the
government reconsidered and concluded that direct appeal was not authorized and
moved that the case be remanded to the Ninth Circuit. This motion was denied and
further consideration of the question of jurisdiction was postponed until the hearing
on the merits. 397 U.S. 985 (1970) (No. 1082, 1969 Term; renumbered No. 77, 1970
Term). The Court handed down its decision denying jurisdiction and remanding to
the Ninth Circuit. 39 U.S.L.W. 4261 (Feb. 24, 1971).
4. The earliest judicial approval of the regulation appears to be Lehr v. United
States, 139 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1943). Since then the regulation has been upheld by
nine of the 11 courts of appeal. See Cassidy v. United States, 428 F.2d 585 (8th Cir.
1970); United States v. Evans, 425 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Willis,
409 F.2d 830 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 864 (1969); Nickerson v. United States,
391 F.2d 760 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 907 (1968); United States v. Dicks,
392 F.2d 524 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Stafford, 389 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968);
United States v. Mientke, 387 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1011
1968); United States v. Sturgis, 342 F.2d 328 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879
(1965); Peterson v. United States, 173 F.2d 111 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 925
(1949). In the First Circuit, a district court has upheld the regulation. United
States v. Hosmer, 310 F. Supp. 1166 (D. Me. 1970). It appears that neither the court
of appeals nor the district court in the District of Columbia has considered the ques-
tion.
5. The first regulation, which was promulgated pursuant to the Selective Service
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(1) as unauthorized by the Military Selective Service Act of 1967,6 and
(2) as a violation of due process. However, since the court's holding was
predicated on the non-constitutional grounds, it avoided the full develop-
ment of the due process question. This article analyzes the regulation's valid-
ity at both levels and concludes that the Weller court was correct in voiding
the regulation but erred in deciding on non-constitutional grounds. 7
and Training Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 885, provided that "no registrant may be represented
before the local board by an attorney." 32 C.F.R. § 603.369(a) (1940 Supp.). The
designation was changed to 32 C.F.R. § 625.2(a) in 1941. 6 Fed. Reg. 6843. It
was re-promulgated in its present form as 32 C.F.R. § 624.1(b) under the Selective
Service Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 604; the designation was changed to 32 C.F.R. § 1624.1
(b) in 1949, 14 Fed. Reg. 5021. The phrase "anyone acting as attorney or legal coun-
sel" was apparently added to ensure the prohibition of lay draft counselors as well as
lawyers.
6. 50 U.S.C. App. 451 et seq. (1964). Weller was the first case in which the statu-
tory authorization question was discussed; all previous decisions dealt only with the con-
stitutional issue.
7. Due process was the only constitutional issue raised in the district court opinion,
and that question is discussed fully in this article. Sixth amendment right to counsel
was not treated by the district court. However, it is relevant and merits some discus-
sion.
The sixth amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right .. . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." In several
recent cases registrants, who have been denied classification as conscientious objectors,
have argued that this guarantee is applicable to the personal appearance. See, e.g.,
United States v. Sturgis, 342 F.2d 328 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
They argue that in the case of a CO the classification procedure is a "critical stage"
in the criminal process. Cf. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 487-88 (1964); Hamil-
ton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53 (1961). This argument was outlined in United States
v. Freeman, 388 F.2d 246 (7th Cir. 1967).
A sincere claimant for conscientious objector status cannot turn to the habeas
corpus remedy because his religious belief prevents him from accepting induc-
tion under any circumstances. As a result he is limited to seeking review in a
criminal trial for refusing to submit. In this criminal proceeding, as in any
proceeding reviewing a draft classification, his defense of invalid classification
is tested by the "basis in fact" formula. Under these circumstances conviction
is almost inevitable, since the Board's refusal to grant the conscientious
objector classification is based on an inference as to the sincerity of the
registrant's belief and there will almost always be something in the record to
support an inference of lack of sincerity.
Id. at 248-49.
In applying the sixth amendment's protection, courts must analyze whether poten-
tial substantial prejudice to defendant's rights inheres in the particular confronta-
tion and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice." United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967). Such analysis has resulted in determinations that the right
to counsel is applicable to pretrial police interrogations, Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201 (1964) and criminal tax investigations where the suspect is in custody, Mathis
v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968). At least one court has suggested that local board
proceedings might be included in this line of development of the sixth amendment. In
United States v. Wierzchucki, 248 F. Supp. 788, 790 (W.D. Wis. 1965) the court called
for a re-evaluation of "the constitutional implications of the closed circuit" procedures
involved in prosecutions of Selective Service violations in light of the "expanding con-
cept of the right to counsel in criminal cases."
But can a right to counsel at the personal appearance be logically extrapolated from
the sixth amendment's guarantee of "Assistance of Counsel" for "defence" of the ac-
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Statutory Authorization
The Weller court's resolution of the statutory authorization issue was incor-
rect because it improperly applied the "explicit action" doctrine of Greene
v. McElroy.8 In Greene the Supreme Court held that congressional authori-
zation for administrative rules that deny traditional procedural safeguards
is not to be presumed "by implication or without the most explicit action
by the Nation's lawmakers, even in areas where it is possible that the Consti-
tution presents no inhibition." In holding certain procedures of the In-
dustrial Security Program invalid, the Court stated:
[I]t must be made clear that the President or Congress, within
their respective constitutional powers, specifically has decided that
the imposed procedures are necessary and warranted and has au-
thorized their use. . . . Such decisions cannot be assumed by
acquiescence or non-action . . . . They must be made explicitly
not only to assure that individuals are not deprived of cherished
rights under procedures not actually authorized . . .but also be-
cause explicit action, especially in areas of doubtful constitution-
ality, requires careful and purposeful consideration by those respon-
sible for enacting and implementing our laws.10
In Weller, the district court reasoned that this language required invali-
dation of the regulation since "nowhere in the [Selective Service] Act has
Congress expressly denied the right to counsel or expressly delegated the
power to do so to the President."1 1  Rather, the President is merely em-
powered "to prescribe the necessary rules and regulations to carry out the
provisions of" the Act. 12 The court concluded that this is not the "'explicit
action by the Nation's lawmakers' . . taking the constitutionally-suspect
action of removing the right to be represented by counsel" required by
Greene.13
The court's interpretation of the "explicit action" doctrine proves simplistic,
cused" in a "criminal prosecution." In all instances where the right has been ap-
plied, there has been at least a purported crime, and the person afforded the right
has been a suspect. At the time of the personal appearance there is no suspicion of
criminal conduct by the registrant. Therefore, extension of the sixth amendment's
right to counsel to the personal appearance would seem precluded by the limitation
to criminal prosecutions. The arguments offered to support this extension fit more
comforiably under the due process clause. They show that at the personal appearance,
local boards "adjudicate or make binding determinations which directly affect the
legal rights of" the registrant. Cf. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960). See
notes 38-55 and accompanying text, infra.
8. 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
9. Id. at 508 (emphasis added).
10. Id. at 507.
11. 309 F. Supp. at 51.
12. 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(1) (1964).
13. 309 F. Supp. at 52.
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since it fails to consider the Supreme Court's modification of Greene in Han-
nah v. Larche.14 In Hannah the Court applied the "explicit action" doc-
trine to certain procedural rules' 5 used by the Civil Rights Commission
in conducting investigations under the Civil Rights Act of 1957.16 The
three-judge district court which first considered the question in Hannah made
the same error as the district court in Weller. It based its decision .solely on
the words of the statute. Relying on Greene, the statutory court stated:
[W]e find nothing in the Act which expressly authorizes or permits
the Commission's refusal to inform persons . . . of the nature,
cause and source of the accusations against them, and there is
nothing in the Act authorizing the Commission to deprive these per-
sons of the right of confrontation and cross-examination. 17
The Supreme Court reversed, explaining that Greene should not be applied
to all cases concerning questionable administrative procedures. In Greene the
Court was aware that Congress knew of the questioned procedures but did not
consider corrective legislation. Moreover, the Government relied solely on
this congressional acquiescence as evidence of authorization. By contrast, in
Hannah the Court found considerable legislative deliberation on the ques-
tioned procedures. The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 re-
veals that Congress considered two bills--one providing the procedural safe-
guards insisted on by the witnesses in Hannah while the second did not.' 8
Congress enacted the second bill, from which the Supreme Court concluded:
The legislative background of the Civil Rights Act not only pro-
vides evidence of congressional authorization, but it also distin-
guishes [this case] from Greene v. McElroy . . . upon which the
court below relied so heavily. . . . The facts of this case present
a sharp contrast to those before the Court in Greene. Here, we
have substantially more than the mere acquiescence upon which the
Government relied in Greene. There was a conscious, intentional
selection by Congress of one bill, providing for none of the proce-
dures demanded by respondents, over another bill, which provided
for all those procedures. 19
Thus to determine whether Congress has authorized certain administrative
procedures, a court should review the legislative history as well as the statute
itself. The Weller court failed to do this.
14. 363 U.S. 420 (1960). Hannah is cited in Weller but not in connection with
the statutory authorization issue.
15. Witnesses before the commission objected to the denial of rights of apprisal,
confrontation, and cross-examination.
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1975a-e (1964).
17. Larche v. Hannah, 177 F. Supp. 816, 822 (W.D. La. 1959). Compare the
language of the district court in Weller cited note 9 supra.
18. 363 U.S. at 434-37.
19. Id. at 438-39.
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The legislative history of the Military Selective Service Act reveals evidence
of congressional authorization similar to that found by the Court in Hannah.
During hearings before the House Armed Services Committee, Representa-
tive Melvin R. Laird asked the Committee to consider deleting the pro-
hibition of counsel. 20  In his statement before the same committee, Rep-
resentative William F. Ryan noted a similar prohibition of counsel in
Selective Service appeals procedures and requested that the ban be re-
moved. 21  In responding to these suggestions, the Director of Selective
Service told the Committee that the prohibition of counsel was necessary to
the efficient operation of the System. 22 The Director also referred the Com-
mittee to the House Judiciary Committee's report on the bill which became
Public Law 89-332 entitled "An Act to provide for the right of persons to be
represented in matters before Federal agencies. '23  This report stated:
In this connection the committee wishes to make clear that the
bill would not affect the operations of the boards of the Selective
Service System. The functions performed under the Universal Mil-
itary Training and Service Act [now the Military Selective Service
Act] are expressly excluded from the operation of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, except those relating to public information.
Under regulations prescribed by the President a registrant may
not be represented before a local board by an attorney. This is be-
cause of the large number of registrants involved, the informality of
the procedures, and the need for a capacity to provide large
numbers of men quickly for service. [The. present bill] does
not extend a right of representation to the Selective Service Sys-
tem, where the right does not now exist.24
The Committee must have agreed with the Director, since it failed to recom-
mend deletion of the ban on counsel in its report on the bill25 which became
the Selective Service Act.
The reformers received a similar response during the floor debates. In
the House, Robert K. Kastenmeier criticized the bill for its failure to pro-
vide a right of counsel to registrants at appeal hearings .2  His plea appar-
ently raised little support. In the Senate, Wayne Morse introduced an amend-
20. Hearings on Review of the Administration and Operation of the Selective Service
System Before the House Comm. on Armed Services, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9889-90
(1966).
21. Id. at 9921. Rep. Ryan addressed his remarks mainly to the procedures before
the appeal boards; however, he also alluded to the general lack of counsel at all steps
in the System.
22. Id. at 9984-88.
23. H.R. REP. No. 1141, 89th Cong., lst Sess. (1965).
24. Id. at 5.
25. S. 1432, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
26. 113 CONG. REc. 14119 (1967).
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ment which provided "Each individual shall be afforded the opportunity to
appear in person and be represented by counsel before the local board .... -27
The amendment failed to draw support and was defeated. 28
The Selective Service System was again the subject of legislative action in
1969. In the House, Frank Thompson introduced a bill 29 which provided
"ieach registrant the right to appear in person before . . .local boards, and
to be represented by counsel, irrespective of his ability to pay for counsel
.... "3o An identical bill31 was introduced in the Senate by Edward M.
Kennedy. Neither bill was reported out of committee.
Thus, in both 1967 and 1969, there was "a conscious, intentional selec-
tion by Congress of one bill, providing for none of the procedures demanded
. . .over another bill, which provided for all those procedures. '3 2  There
can be "no doubt that Congress' consideration and rejection of [the right to
counsel at the personal appearance] constituted an authorization to the [Se-
lective Service System] to conduct its hearings according to the [riules of
[p]rocedure it has adopted. '33
Had the Weller court followed the Hannah rule and reviewed the legisla-
tive history of the Selective Service Act, it could not invalidate the regula-
tion on statutory authority grounds. The result necessitates a full exposition
of the due process issue.
Due Process
The Weller court suggested that the regulation prohibiting counsel violates
due process; but due to its unwarranted reliance on the statutory authoriza-
tion issue, the court's reasoning on the due process question suffers from a
lack of depth. The Weller court's analysis will provide a basis for an in-
depth study of the regulation as it relates to due process.
There is no universally accepted methodology for resolving problems in-
volving due process. It is an "elucive concept." 34  However, it is gen-
erally agreed that any analysis must investigate the following issues: (1) ap-
plicability of due process; (2) requirements of due process; and (3) balance
27. Id. at 12502. The amendment also extended the right "to present testimony or
other evidence to the local board ......
28. Id. at 12502-04. The vote was 55-17 (28 not voting).
29. H.R. 7784, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 303 (1969).
30. Hearings on H.R. 14001 and H.R. 14015 Before the Special Subcomm. on the
Draft of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 4589 (1969)
(Statement of Rep. Thompson).
31. S. 1145, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
32. Cf. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. at 439.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 442.
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of governmental interest and private rights. 85 This section will apply the
three-fold test to the challenged regulation to show that the Weller court's
suggestion that the regulation violates due process is correct.
Applicability of due process
The Weller court resolved this issue as follows. First, it reviewed recent
due process developments and noted that the concept had been applied in
cases involving: liquor license applications, termination of welfare pay-
ments, admission to the bar, and juvenile proceedings. Second, the court
noted that the interests involved in those cases were often less important
than the interests involved in a registrant's personal appearance. From this
the court concluded that due process must be applied to the personal
appearance.A6
This analysis is misdirected. The touchstone for applicability of due
process is not the relative importance of the interests involved in the pro-
ceeding. Rather, it is the character of the decisions rendered which must be
examined. 37 Due process applies only when a government proceeding results
in a deprivation of life, liberty, or property. But the rights included in this
protected triumvirate are not limited to the common meaning of the words. ss
The protection of due process has been extended whenever "governmental
agencies adjudicate or make binding determinations which directly affect the
legal rights of individuals." 39 Thus, the requirements of due process are not
imposed on administrative agencies which issue only advisory opinions or
otherwise make non-determinative decisions. 40
In Weller the district court concluded that "a registrant's personal ap-
pearance before his local board is in every sense an adjudication at which
the registrant should be awarded traditional judicial safeguards." 41  However
the majority of courts have taken a contrary view. Most courts have taken
the common description of personal appearances as "nonjudicial hearings"
35. See, e.g., the methodology of the Court in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970); Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); and Hannah
v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
36. 309 F. Supp. at 54-56.
37. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
38. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (due process protection is extended to
welfare benefits); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (unemployment compensa-
tion); Willner v. Comm. on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (professional
licenses); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (tax exemptions).
39. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. at 442.
40. See, e.g., In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957). But see Jenkins v. McKeithen,
395 U.S. 411 (1969). See also Note, The Effect of Public Opprobrium on Investigative
Due Process, 22 S. CAR. L. REV. 392 (1970).
41. 309 F. Supp. at 55.
[Vol. 20:478
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as conclusive proof of the nature of the board's determinations. 42  The error
of such reasoning is made readily apparent by Professor Davis:
The crucial question is not characterization of the whole proceed-
ings as judicial or nonjudicial but the presence or absence of
adjudicative facts. 4.3
Adjudicative facts are the facts about the parties and their activi-
ties, businesses, and properties. Adjudicative facts ususally an-
swer the questions of who did what, where, when, how, why,
and with what motive or intent. . .44
The Selective Service System itself has consistently characterized its pro-
ceedings as non-adjudicatory. A persual of the System's regulations and
literature reveals a conscious effort to refrain from using such terminology as
"hearing" or "adjudication." Local and appeal boards are constantly re-
ferred to as "administrative bodies" whose decisions are "administrative de-
cisions rather than judicial or quasi-judicial decisions. ' 45  However, the
substance of the System's regulations belies this assessment. For example,
the regulations require the board to place in class 1-A any "registrant who
has failed to establish to the satisfaction of the local board ... that he is eligi-
ble for classification in another class."'46 Thus, every registrant is presumed
available for immediate induction. If he wishes to prove otherwise, he must
come forward with satisfactory evidence. Each classification "is based on
matters to be decided in a particular case and each case is decided upon its
own individual facts without reference to the facts in any other case."'47
Proponents of the regulation argue that since there is no constitutional
right to deferments or exemptions, due process does not apply to the proceed-
42. See cases cited note 4 supra.
43. 1 K. DAVIs, ADMImSTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.03, at 418 (1958).
44. Id. § 7.02, at 413. In Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 962 (1961) "adjudication" was defined as "the applica-
tion of a statute or other legal standard to a given fact situation involving particular
individuals." Id. at 896.
In the Administrative Procedure Act "adjudication" means the formulation of an
agency order which finally disposes of any matter other than by rule-making. Rule-
making is the formulation of an "agency statement of general or particular applicability
and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or to de-
scribe the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of any agency .... " 5
U.S.C. §§ 1001(c)-(d) (1964).
45. See, e.g., STAFF OF THE HousE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, 85TH CONG., lST
SESS., SURVEY AND STUDY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION, PROCEDURE, AND PRACTICE
IN THE FEDERAL AGENCIES 1977 (Comm. Print 1957) (Selective Service System's Re-
sponse to questionnaire).
46. 32 C.F.R. § 1622.10 (1970).
47. SURVEY, supra note 45, at 1978. Compare this description of the classification
process, with the classic definition of adjudication found in I K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw TREATISE § 7.02, at 413 (1958). See notes 43-44 and accompanying text, supra.
1970]
Catholic University Law Review
ings in which they are granted or denied. 48  Such reasoning has been re-
cently discredited. 49  The argument fails to consider that the very fact that
Congress has stipulated terms and conditions for granting a privilege is one
reason that due process is required. At the personal appearance, the local
board must explore the situation of the individual registrant to determine
which set of terms and conditions he fits. It must answer questions about
the registrant and his activities; who did what, where, when, how, why, and
with what motive or intent. That is adjudication50 and due process must be
afforded.
Moreover, in Goldberg v. Kelly,5 1 the Supreme Court indicated that due
process is applicable to any proceeding where the government seeks to
terminate "benefits [which] are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons
qualified to receive them."' 52 When Goldberg is viewed in light of the
Court's recent decisions in Oestereich v. Selective Service Board53 and Breen
v. Selective Service Board,54 which indicate that assignment to a particu-
ular classification is a matter of statutory right, the apparent conclusion is
that due process applies to the personal appearance.
Right to counsel as a requirement of due process
As the Weller court recognized, a procedural element is required by due pro-
cess only if classified as a fundamental safeguard. 55 The basic method for
determining whether an element can be so classified consists of examining
48. Cf. DiMarco v. Greene, 385 F.2d 556, 563 (6th Cir. 1967) which held that
since release on parole was considered a privilege, the state may prohibit counsel at a
pre-release hearing.
49. See Davis, The Requirement of Opportunity to be Heard in the Administra-
tive Process, 51 YALE L.J. 1093 (1942). "A procedure which is unfair for inflicting
a penalty is not rendered fair by using it for withdrawing a benefit. If the govern-
ment. . . chooses to provide benefits, even outright gifts, the method of determining the
individual recipients must still be fair." Id. at 1123. See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970). See generally Reich, Withdrawal of Public Welfare: The Right to a
Prior Hearing, 76 YALE L.J. 1234 (1967); Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare:
The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965); Reich, The New Property, 73
YALE L.J. 733 (1964). But cf. Wyman v. James, 39 U.S.L.W. 4085 (U.S. Jan. 12,
1971).
50. See notes 43-44 and accompanying text, supra. The French have not been so
reluctant to recognize that such classification decisions amount to adjudication. They
have a system of compulsory military service similar to ours. Deferments are granted to
qualified men. The decisions concerning assignment of these deferments are consid-
ered adjudicatory decisions in French law. INT'L COMM'N OF JUISTS, EXECUTIVE Ac-
THON AND THE RULE OF LAW 75-76 (1962) (Statement by Prof. Jean Paul Gilli).
51. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
52. Id. at 262.
53. 393 U.S. 233 (1968).
54. 396 U.S. 460 (1970).
55. 309 F. Supp. at 53.
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"moral judgments already made on the point at issue, sought for in the ex-
press or implicit views of important segments of our society, past or pres-
ent." 15 6 There is no scarcity of such judgments on the question of represen-
tation by counsel. Only a few need be presented here.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the right to be represented by
retained counsel in court is an element of due process. As Justice Suther-
land stated in Powell v. Alabama:5 7
If in any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal court were
arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by
and appearing for him, it reasonably may not be doubted that such
a refusal would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due pro-
cess in the constitutional sense. 58
The unanimity of opinion on this point is evidenced by the lack of any re-
ported cases challenging it. Thus when a person is subjected to a deprivation
of life, liberty, or property in court, he may be represented by his attorney.
But when the adjudicating forum is an administrative agency such as the
Selective Service System, the government feels free to prohibit counsel. This
dichotomy cannot be justified. "Although [court] and administrative pro-
cedures may vary in detail, the ultimate goal of [each] is the rectitude of deci-
sion as between opposing interests and the just dealing of government with its
citizens."59 If counsel is required by due process in court adjudication, it is
also required in adjudicative administrative proceedings.
The most revealing evidence that legal representation is an essential ele-
ment of due process is that of all federal administrative agencies only the
Selective Service System prohibit counsel at its hearings.60 In 1955, the
Hoover Commission's task force on legal services and procedures noted that:
Every individual has the right under our constitutional system to
appear in person before an agency to answer charges or to re-
quest appropriate action. The right to be accompanied by an attor-
ney-at-law in good standing or other duly qualified representative in
appearances before agencies, however, has not always been re-
spected. 6'
56. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and
Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 327 (1957).
57. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
58. Id. at 69.
59. COMM'N ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXEcuTIvE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT,
TASK FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE 138 (1955) [hereinafter cited
as TASK FORCE REPORT].
60. SURVEY, supra note 45 at 1978. A questionnaire circulated to all administrative
agencies asked: "Does the agency give recognition to the right of persons to be repre-
sented by an attorney?" Id. at 1855. The Selective Service System was the only agency
to reply in the negative.
61. TASK FORCE REPORT at 287.
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In support of this observation, the task force cited: the denial of counsel by
the Internal Revenue Service in non-public investigatory proceedings; restric-
tion of legal representation for Indians under the Code of Tribal Offenses;
and the Selective Service System's ban on attorneys.02 As a corrective
measure the task force recommended that:
Every person, party, or organization should have a statutory right
to appear by or with an attorney-at-law or other qualified repre-
sentative in any formal or informal proceeding before an adminis-
trative agency.63
Following the task force report the prohibition of counsel has been removed
in all administrative agencies except the Selective Service. 64
The recognition of representation by counsel as an element of due pro-
cess is not limited to current American legal thought. In 1962, the Inter-
national Commission of Jurists at its Congress on Executive Action and
the Rule of Law concluded:
In nearly every country one type of action of administrative agen-
cies and executive officials is in the nature of adjudication, and the
decisions made are similar to judicial decisions. Whatever varia-
tions in procedure may be appropriate to this kind of Executive ac-
tion, there are certain fundamental principles that must be fol-
lowed if the Rule of Law is to be preserved. These are:
(4) [the] right to be represented by counsel or other qualified
person65 ...
Representation by counsel has been a commonplace in American jurispru-
dence since the early colonial period. For example, under both the First and
Second Charters of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, parties were represented
by atorneys in all cases, including administrative matters such as licensing or-
dinaries and meeting houses.66
Today as throughout our history, the right to appear with counsel at adju-
62. Id. at 287-88.
63. Id. at 287. In its report to Congress the Commission modified this task force
recommendation to exclude the Selective Service System from its provisions. No reason
was given for the change. COMM'N ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF
THE GOVERNMENT, LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE 31-32 (1955).
64. See SURVEY, note 45 supra.
65. INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, EXECUTIVE ACTION AND THE RULE OF LAW 25 (1962).
Also listed as fundamental principles were: advance notice to the parties of the nature
and purpose of the proceedings; adequate opportunity to prepare the case including ac-
cess to relevant data; right to be heard with an opportunity to present arguments and
evidence and to meet opposing arguments and evidence; adequate notice of decision and
reasons therefore; and right of recourse to higher administrative authority or to courts.
Id.
66. COLONIAL JUSTICE IN WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS 69, 183, 194 (J. Smith ed.
1961).
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dicative hearings ranks as a fundamental procedural safeguard required by
due process.
Governmental interest versus private rights
The previous two sections have shown: (1) that due process is applicable
to the personal appearance because it is an adjudicative hearing, and (2)
that the right to appear with counsel is a requirement of due process. Or-
dinarily, these conclusions would suffice to demonstrate that the Selective
Service System's prohibition of counsel violates due process. However, in due
process cases courts have held that an individual's right to a particular pro-
cedural safeguard may be counter-balanced by the government's right to pro-
tect a substantial interest. That is, if allowing the demanded procedure
would sufficiently endanger a governmental interest, courts hold that the pro-
cedure is not required by due process. 7
There is some question as to just how endangered a governmental inter-
est must be before a court will endorse the withholding of a fundamental
safeguard. 68 This question can be resolved by analogy to fourth amend-
ment69 procedures. The constitutional guarantee of freedom from unreason-
able searches and seizures can be viewed as a specialized due process clause.
Both provisions set forth procedures to be followed in governmental depri-
vations of liberty and property. The basic protection against an unreason-
able search or seizure is the warrant based on probable cause, while the
fifth amendment's basic protection against unlawful deprivations is the fun-
damental safeguards of due process.
To exercise his fourth amendment right, one need only show that a
search or seizure has occurred. The government must then show that it
complied with the amendment's procedures. There is a rebuttable presump-
67. See e.g., Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961): "[C]on-
sideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of circum-
stances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government func-
tion involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental
action." Id. at 895. "Whether the Constitution requires that a particular right obtain
in a specific proceeding depends upon a complexity of factors. The nature of the al-
leged right involved, the nature of the proceeding, and the possible burden on that
proceeding, are all considerations which must be taken into account." Hannah v.
Larcke, 363 U.S. at 442.
68. Compare the cases cited note 67 supra, with Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708
(9th Cir. 1955) in which the court stated that the government must use a system which
affords the "maximum procedural safeguards . . . without jeopardizing" the objective of
the process involved. Id. at 718.
69. U.S. CONST. amend. IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized."
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tion of invalidity if the search or seizure was not authorized by a valid war-
rant. This presumption can be rebutted only by showing that deviation
from the basic warrant procedure was necessary to protect a substantial
governmental interest. 70 Thus by analogy it appears that in due process
cases the government is justified in withholding fundamental procedural safe-
guards only when that course is essential to the protection of a substantial
interest. This section will show that the prohibition of counsel at the per-
sonal appearance is not essential to the operation of the Selective Service
System.
The System's Director has stated that the Weller decision would "place
an intolerable burden upon the administration of the Selective Service Sys-
tem . . . and . . . would result in constructive paralysis of the . . . Sys-
tem in the performance of its mission of procurement of manpower for the
Department of Defense."' 71 As an "illustration of the administrative havoc
that would be wrought . . . if . . . attorneys [were] allowed to be present
for each personal appearance" the Director noted that in the year ending
September 30, 1969, local boards conducted between 190,000 and 210,000
personal appearances. 72 The implication is that the mere presence of a law-
yer would so confuse these proceedings as to destroy the ability of the Sys-
tem to function effectively. This confusion could arise from two sources:
(1) the dilatory tactics of the lawyer, or (2) the inability of the board mem-
bers to cope with the legal arguments of counsel.
Although there are imperfections in the Selective Service regulations,
which may be used for delaying the classification and induction process, 73
the admittance of counsel to the personal appearance would not enhance his
ability to take advantage of these loopholes. Such delays are a product of
70. See the dissent by Justice Frankfurter in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S.
56, 68 (1950) which is basically the prevailing view today. See also Chimel v. Cali-
fornia, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964). There are
several generally accepted exceptions to the warrant requirement. However, these ex-
ceptions are justified in terms of necessity and the burden is on the government to
show that exigent circumstances preclude use of a warrant. United States v. Rabino-
witz, 339 U.S. at 68, 70.
71. Letter from Director of Selective Service Lewis B. Hershey to Attorney General
John N. Mitchell, Oct. 3, 1969, in Brief for Appellant at 74-75, United States v.
Weller, (U.S. No. 77, 1970 Term).
72. Letter from Director of Selective Service Lewis B. Hershey to John L. Murphy,
Dep't of Justice, Oct. 7, 1969, in Brief for Appellant at 76-77, United States v. Weller,
(U.S. No. 77, 1970 Term).
73. A common delaying technique consists of requesting a re-opening of the reg-
istrant's file just as the appeal process on a previous classification is being completed.
This second request for re-opening must be granted unless it is clearly frivolous even
though the reason for the request was known to the registrant at the time of the pre-
vious classification. See Mulloy v. United States, 398 U.S. 410 (1970); 32 C.F.R.
§ 1625.2 (1970).
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loose regulations. Any registrant or his lawyer can take advantage of them
by correspondence. The solution to this problem is tighter regulations,
74
not a ban on counsel. Keeping the lawyer out of the personal appearance
does not significantly decrease his ability to use these unproductive tactics;
it only serves to diminish his effectiveness in the more beneficial aspects of
the profession.
If the expected confusion at the personal appearance is caused by the in-
ability of the board members to cope with the legal knowledge of counsel, it
will only serve to emphasize that the presence of a lawyer is desirable. The
statutes, rules, and court decisions concerning the prerequisites for the various
classifications are indeed complicated. 75 But is it asking too much to re-
quire that the people who are responsible for classifying the registrants to be
thoroughly familar with these prerequisites? Certainly any confusion can be
remedied by requiring all board members to be educated on the laws and reg-
ulations which they purport to administer. The familiar description of local
boards as "little groups of neighbors" who deal in a friendly, informal man-
ner with friends and acquaintances has proven a mirage. 76 Regardless of
the validity of this concept, when an administrative body makes final deter-
minations affecting the rights of individuals, familiarity with the individual is
no substitute for familiarity with the statutes, regulations and other legal
standards involved in the adminstrative process.
The Director has further suggested that Selective Service procedures are so
simple that legal advice at the personal appearance is unnecessary. 77 The
initial response is that the Director has a strange definition of "simple." How-
74. For example the technique mentioned in note 73, supra, could be eliminated by
issuing a regulation providing for waiver of all objections to a classification which
were known but not made at a previous personal appearance. See FED. R. Civ. P.
12(h)(1).
75. For a review of the issues involved in a conscientious objector case, see United
States v. Haughton, 413 F.2d 736 (9th Cir. 1969).
76. See THE NAT'L ADVISORY COMm'N ON SELECTIVE SERVICE, IN PURSUIT OF
EQUITY: WHO SERVES WHEN NOT ALL SERVE? 20 (1967) [hereinafter cited as AD-
VISORY COMM'N REPORT]; J. DAVIS & K. DOLBEARE, LITTLE GROUPS OF NEIGHBORS:
THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM (1969).
77. Hearings on Review of the Administration and Operation of the Selective Service
System Before the House Comm. on Armed Services, 89 Cong., 2d Sess. 9987 (1966).
In the same sentence, the director made the somewhat contradictory observation that
allowing counsel would give an unfair advantage to those who could afford a lawyer's
services. If the procedures are so simple that anyone can understand, why would
advice of counsel be an advantage? If the process is pellucid to start with, it is
hard to see how any amount of elucidation could give an advantage. The Director
could have been alluding to a tactical advantage, but, as explained in the text, the
lawyer's presence at the personal appearance is not necessary for the formulation of
tactics. Once this point is realized, the Director's statement must be recognized as an
acknowledgment that the presence of counsel at the personal appearance would be
helpful to the registrant. The registrant with counsel would have an advantage over the
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ever, even if the procedures were simple, the ban on counsel would not be
justified. The test is not "Is the presence of an attorney necessary?" but rath-
er, "Is the prohibition of attorneys necessary?"
An attorney can serve many purposes other than explaining complex legal
issues. As the court in Weller suggests, he can "act as a deterrent to pos-
sible abrupt or summary treatment."78 This effect of the lawyers presence
is well documented. One study of the System observed that local boards
took greater pains to substantiate information given to registrants when an
attorney was present than when the registrant was alone. 79  As the district
court also noted, counsel can also serve to "bridge potential hostilities . . .
between the board members . . . and the registrant. ' 80 Regardless of the
neutrality of the board members, the registrant will see them as adversaries.
After all, if he agrees with the board, he has no need for a personal appear-
ance."'
Probably the most important function of counsel at the personal appear-
ance is simply to recognize mistakes on issues of law so they may be pre-
registrant without counsel. The System's remedy for this is to ban counsel altogether
and thus give all registrants an equal disadvantage. This approach is unique but not
very satisfactory. The opposite course--equal advantage to all registrants by universal
availability of counsel-would seem more readily attainable. All registrants who
desire counsel and can afford a lawyer should be allowed to retain counsel. Registrants
who desire counsel but cannot afford one could be handled in two ways. The local
board could furnish the registrant with a list of legal aid and public defender services
(both public and private) which are available for free legal counselling. See A. TATUM
& J. TUcHINsKY, GUIDE TO THE DRAFT 272-81 (1969) for a list of 123 organizations
offering free draft counselling. Registrants who are unable to acquire representation
through these channels could be accommodated by a reconstructed government appeal
agent program. To accomplish this, the regulations would be amended to give these
advisors the freedom and independence required for adequate representation. See notes
88-96 and accompanying text, infra.
78. 309 F. Supp. at 55. Compare the function suggested for the lawyer here, with
the function assigned in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
79. Note, Fairness and Due Process Under the Selective Service System, 114 U. PA.
L. REv. 1014, 1033 (1966). See also Barnhart, The Lawyer and Selective Service,
32 TEXAS B.J. 17, 54 (1969); Margolis, Trying a Case under the Selective Service
Law, 26 GUILD PRACTITIONER 101 (1967).
80. 309 F. Supp. at 55.
81. Comment, The Selective Service System: An Administrative Obstacle Course,
54 CAL. L. REV. 2123, 2148 (1966). The absence of anyone who shares the regis-
trant's point of view puts him at a disadvantage psychologically. Since he sees the
board members as adversaries, his relations with them are frought with anxiety. This
anxiety leads to a restriction of communication which serves to amplify the feelings of
hostility on both sides. The presence of a lawyer or other counselor would serve to
decrease the anxiety and thus increase meaningful communications between the regis-
trant and the board. See generally H. LINDGREN, EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP IN HUMAN
RELATIONS (1954); White & Lippett, Leader Behavior and Member Reaction in Three
"Social Climates," in GROUP DYNAMICS: RESEARCH AND THEORY 40 (D. Cartwright &
A. Zander eds. 1953); Newcomb, Autistic Hostility and Social Reality, 1 HUMAN RE-
L.ATIONS 68 (1947).
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served for appeal. Due to the complexity of the issues, the registrant may
not even recognize a mistake in the proceedings. The proceedings are
not usually recorded so there is little chance for post-hearing discovery of the
error. The detection of such mistakes of law is especially important in
draft cases due to restricted judicial review. Review of the facts is precluded
if the court finds a "basis in fact" for the board's decision.8 2 However, the
court's review of the law is not so circumscribed. The court has broad power
to correct mistakes of law,8 3 but that power cannot be invoked if the mis-
take is never discovered.
It has been suggested that the admittance of counsel to the personal appear-
ance would rigidify the proceedings and convert the present informal pro-
cedure into a conventional trial-type hearing with strict legal rules. The
Supreme Court found this argument unpersuasive in Goldberg v. Kelly where
it ruled out the prohibition of counsel at informal pre-termination hearings for
welfare recipients. The contention was dismissed by the Court stating that
it did "not anticipate that [the assistance of counsel would] unduly pro-
long or otherwise encumber the hearing. "84
The System's figure of 210,000 personal appearances per year is not as
heavy a burden as it initially appears. There are over 4,000 local boards
with a total of over 17,000 members.8 5 The regulations call for the pres-
ence of a "member or members" at a personal appearance.8 6  If there is
an average of two members at each personal appearance, each member need
participate in an average of less than two hearings per month. Thus, even a
significant increase in the time required for a personal appearance should
not overburden the System. 7
Proponents of the prohibition argue that the availability of "advisors to
82. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
83. See, e.g., Oestereich v. Selective Service Bd., 393 U.S. 233 (1968).
84. 397 U.S. at 271. A similar contention was rejected in Fleming v. Tate, 156
F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1946) which involved the presence of counsel at a parole board
hearing:
The presence of counsel is meant as a measure of protection to the prisoner;
it should not be permitted to become a measure of embarrassment to the tribu-
nal. . . . [T]he presence of counsel and receipt of evidence, are the basic
characteristics of our whole system of administration of justice. To say they
cause the degradation of a proceeding into an uncontrolled melee is to deny
fundamentals.
Id. at 850. See also First Nat'l Bank v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267, 273 (4th Cir. 1965)
(dissenting opinion).
85. DIRECTOR OF SELECTIVE SERVICE, ANNUAL REPORT FOR FIsCAL YEAR 1967, at 3,'5.
86. 32 C.F.R. § 1624.2(a) (1970).
87. Note also that even under the present regulations the members of the local
board are authorized to "impose such limitations upon the time which the registrant may
have for his appearance as they deem necessary." Id. § 1624.2(b) (1970).
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registrants"' 8 and "appeal agents"8' 9 makes the advice of outside counsel
unnecessary.90 The argument implies that these counselors provided by the
System can do as much for the registrant as an outside attorney. If this is
true why has the System insisted on maintaining its ban on outside counsel?
The answer is, as the Weller court discussed, 91 appeal agents are not as ef-
fective as retained counsel. They serve as advisors to the board as well as to
the registrant, and are expected "[t]o be equally diligent in protecting the in-
terests of [both]."'92 In addition, the appeal agents are asked to report any in-
formation which could be used for designating a registrant as a delinquent.93
The tenuous contention that these government counselors are effective is
further weaken by evidence gathered in various studies made of the Selective
Service System. These studies have revealed that since the regulation author-
izing local boards to appoint advisors to registrants is wholly permissive,
most boards fail to appoint them.94  Although appointment of appeal
agents is mandatory, they are seldom used. The National Advisory Com-
mission on Selective Service concluded that the appeal agents "appear to
have a negligible effect within the System." 95  Another study reported that
since the appeal agents work directly with and for the local board, they tend
to identify with that body and thus lose the independence necessary for objec-
tive counselling of registrants.96 In light of these observations, the con-
tention that registrants are adequately represented by government advisors
and appeal agents appears spurious.
Conclusion
In defending its prohibition of counsel at the personal appearance, the Selec-
tive Service System contends that the presence of counsel is unnecessary for
the registrant and inconvenient for the System. This article has not tried to
disprove those allegations. Rather, it has attempted to demonstrate their ir-
88. Id. § 1604.41 (1970).
89. Id. § 1604.71 (1970).
90. Again, notice that this argument tries to place the burden on the registrant to
show that counsel is necessary.
91. 309 F. Supp. at 56.
92. 32 C.F.R. § 1604.71(d)(5) (1970).
93. Selective Service Directive dated Oct. 26, 1967. See Layton, Lawyers Cannot
Be Informants, 54 A.B.A.J. 153, 154 (1968); 114 CONG. REc. 14462 (1968) (remarks
of Senator Kennedy).
94. Comment, The Selective Service System: An Administrative Obstacle Course,
54 CAL. L. REV. 2123, 2147-48 (1966).
95. ADVISORY COMM'N REPORT at 108. See also Note, The Selective Service, 76
YALE L.J. 160, 168-69 (1968).
96. Note, Fairness and Due Process Under the Selective Service System, 114 U.
PA. L REv. 1014, 1030 (1966).
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relevance in considering the prohibition's validity. The registrant should
not have the burden of showing his need for counsel. On the contrary, the
System has the burden to show its need for the prohibition and this cannot
be met with arguments based on mere inconvenience.
E. Alex Blanton
